-2 -maintained a strict separation between the histories of metropolitan states (mostly in Europe) and their colonies (mostly outside Europe). In all these fields, the matter of history concerned stability not mobility, what was fixed but not what was mixed.
Historians in all fields have more recently been moving towards studies they describe variously as international, transnational, comparative, and global. Their efforts have not been identical in scope, in subject matter, or in motivation, nor is there any consensus on how these non-national approaches to history should be distinguished from each other. International historians often take for granted the existence of a society of states but look beyond state boundaries to map inter-state relationships, from diplomacy and finance to migration and cultural exchanges. Transnational historians examine processes, movements, and institutions that overflow territorial boundaries: for example, the environment, organized crime, epidemics, corporations, religions, and international social movements. Comparative historians deal with distinct historical subjects-which are often, but not always, nationally defined-in conjunction with each, although not always on the basis of any actual historical connection between their objects of study.
And global historians treat the history and pre-histories of globalization, the histories of objects that have become universalized, and the links between sub-global arenas such as the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans. The family resemblance that links these approaches is the desire to go above or beyond the histories of states defined by nations historical work would be a good question for intellectual history. However, it poses a particular problem for intellectual historians, who have so far written little about the international turn. This absence of engagement can be attributed in part to the reigning materialism of many of the strains of history that comprise the international turn in their field. Historians of capital, empire, and migration, alongside sociologists and archaeologists with global ambitions, have led debate on this movement and produced many of the major works of synthesis. For such historians, 'each age gets the thought it needs'-Buddhism; Christianity; Islam: it's all the same really. 7 To them, intellectual history has seemed immaterial in both senses of that term: a kind of history from the neck up dealing with the insubstantial imaginings of disembodied beings from inner space. A major challenge for intellectual historians is how to combat this skepticism without succumbing to reductionism or dissolving the identity of their field. In this case, the best way to go forwards may be to look backwards, to the roots of intellectual history itself in the period before historiography had been adopted as a handmaiden of national states.
Intellectual history can justifiably claim to have been international history avant la lettre. As Donald Kelley has shown, the first practitioners of the history of ideas, from
Thomas Stanley in mid-seventeenth-century England to Victor Cousin in postNapoleonic France, produced works that were strikingly cosmopolitan in character and content. Their histories sprang from traditions of philosophical eclecticism stretching back to Diogenes Laertius but arose most immediately from early-modern epistemological debates in which ideas were held to be independent of their origins, whether national or otherwise. and an age of rapprochement which is still very much in progress.
In the initial age of engagement, historians of ideas were often methodologically cosmopolitan and politically internationalist in outlook, while historically-minded students of International Relations dealt openly in ideas rather than abstract models or As so often, such intimations of obsolescence proved to be spurs to innovation.
Within little more than a decade, the two fields had begun to converge again. The age of rapprochement beginning in the 1990s saw revivals in both intellectual history and Law ' (1911-50) . 21 The recent revival of the history of international thought has seen it emerge as a robust field in its own right, with a more expansive and less teleological canon of authors, problems and movements, and not just as a subset of the history of political thought. 22 International thought now means less a body of authoritative doctrine to be deployed for present purposes than the past tense of international thinking as the activity of theoretical reflection upon international affairs.
A institutions open to examination by intellectual historians. 35 One product of this expansion has been the new history of human rights, a field now in its second wave, as it has moved from its teleological phase of telling just-so stories into a more critical literature alert to context and to discontinuity. 36 Other subjects of concern to intellectual historians-the history of economic thought; conceptions of war and government; public health; and the history of sciencecan all be researched in the archives of international institutions, companies, and corporations. In this regard, modern intellectual historians can learn from those early modernists who have followed historians of science in constructing intellectual histories of the English and Dutch trading companies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. routes. 41 From such collisions and transmissions emerged 'competing universalisms' of empire, religion, and political economy, for instance, as well as the expansive ideologies that countered or subsumed them, such as pan-Islamism, pan-Africanism, nationalism, anti-colonialism, and other forms of 'colored cosmopolitanism'. 42 Most of these movements were invisible as long as history was viewed through nation-shaped spectacles. They returned to view only when older experiences of space-more extensive, more fluid, and less confined by territorial boundaries-again framed questions about the past.
The field is rife with spatial metaphors-of ideas as 'migratory' and of books escaping the bounds of nations; of 'horizons' of understanding and the public 'sphere'; of 'localism' and 'provincialism' as determinants of ideas; and conceptions of hermeneutic 'containment' and critical 'movement,' for example-but such figures of speech do not indicate any substantive engagement so far with questions of space and place. They are instead shorthand indications that ideas lack material determinants and that they need to be placed into contexts construed almost entirely as temporal and linguistic not physical or spatial. 43 'The result is a kind of intellectual geometry-the positioning of ideas in abstract space-rather than intellectual geography'. 44 Michel Foucault might have been speaking for intellectual historians specifically (rather than all historians more broadly) when he declared in an interview: 'Space was that which was dead, fixed, non-dialectical, immobile. On the other hand, time was rich, fertile, vibrant, dialectical.' 45 Space can be understood intensively as well as extensively. In this regard historians of science may have much to teach both international historians and intellectual historians. A 'spatial turn' in the history of science put in doubt the universality of truth and insisted upon local knowledge: there could be no view from nowhere when every view sprang from somewhere. Ideas emerged from tightly defined spaces, from littoral beaches as well as laboratory benches, and from public drinking-houses as well as royal academies. When viewed microscopically in this way, the seamless web of abstract knowledge turned out to be a brittle mosaic of contingent concerns. 46 If one aim of this literature was to debunk the presumed universality of scientific reason, another was to show just how fragments of knowledge were accumulated and collected and how their credibility was secured. 'We need to understand not only how knowledge is made in specific places but also how transactions occur between places': that is, how ideas travel, who transports them, what baggage they carry on their journeys, and how they become domesticated and naturalized upon arrival.
47
This approach revealed the intricate mechanisms of information-gathering that made scientific knowledge both possible and plausible. Even the most physically isolated of thinkers, like the land-locked Isaac Newton who never saw the sea in his life, could become a global center of calculation because he commanded a worldwide web of correspondents from the Gulf of Tonkin to the Strait of Magellan. 48 Corporate bodies such as the Society of Jesus and the English and Dutch East India Companies facilitated big science, in the sense of the long-distance production of knowledge. 49 And later 'webs of empire' dissolved distinctions between centers and peripheries as each alleged periphery earned a central place in accumulating imperial archives, testing hypotheses, and generating ideologies through inter-colonial exchanges. 50 In these ways, extensively elaborated connections linked intensively cultivated locations to create new maps of knowledge and transnational canons through the transmission of ideas and information across continents and oceans.
These studies in what Pierre Bourdieu called the 'science of international relations with regard to culture' offer more generally replicable models for intellectual history. historians might act as electricians, connecting circuits by acts of imaginative reconstitution rather than simple restitution.' 63 The first of these approaches-connective rather than comparative, reconstitutive rather than restitutive-might be preferable for most historians, but the second is also surely necessary for the creation of the requisite historical distance between past imperatives and current concerns. We surely delude ourselves if we imagine we do not see those concerns through a glass darkly: we will only be able to see them more clearly if we place them in long-range perspective.
'Classism'-the idea that 'only the high, or the great, or the highly educated, have been the subject, in general, of histories of the individual mind, or the individual self'-is a familiar charge against intellectual history, rather than a failing peculiar to intellectual history with an international twist. 64 J. S. Mill, for one, had rebutted it as early as 1838 in his defence of Bentham and Coleridge:
… speculative philosophy, which to the superficial appears a thing so remote from the business of life and the outward interests of men, is in reality the thing on earth which most influences them, and in the long run overbears every other influence save those which it must itself obey. The writers of whom we speak have never been read by the multitude; except for the more slight of their works, their readers have been few: but they have been the teachers of the teachers. 65 In between the speculative philosophers and the multitude are the thinkers of what Emma
Rothschild has called 'intermediate' or 'medium thoughts,' the reflections of those too undistinguished to be the subjects of individual intellectual biography but too profuse in leaving their reflective traces to be subsumed into any history of mentalités, especially, but not exclusively, those engaged in public policy of various kinds. 66 Such people were often globetrotters and go-betweens, members of the massive Asian, European, and African migrations that crossed (and re-crossed) the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the steppes, but also the intercultural agents who trafficked in local knowledge and the creation of 'global intelligence'. 67 As historians reconstruct their forms of intellection, and the histories of their ideas, we can expect to find even more widespread evidence of forms of transnational thinking than ever before. 68 The increasingly elastic definitions of context demanded by transnational history should not deter intellectual historians. Some are beginning to ask how precisely can any idea can be understood 'in context' if context is now defined to encompass intercontinental communications, multilingual communities, or the expansion of world systems? 69 Here again the opportunities may be greater than the dangers. Canons of relevance must be defined, routes of active (or at least plausible) transmission mapped, and scales of reference calibrated according to contemporaries' conceptions of the international or the global; with such boundaries in place, it should be feasible to reconstruct meaningful spatial contexts for the ideas we trace across borders and bounded discursive communities.
Historicizing conceptions of space-of the national, the international, the transnational, and the global-may in fact be the implied agenda for intellectual history after the international turn, just as historicizing conceptions of time was a major project for intellectual history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This agenda leads inexorably to the question what it might mean for intellectual history to take a global
turn. Quite what a global intellectual history would comprise, or even what its subjectmatter will be, is still far from clear, though vigorous debate has already begun about these matters. 70 Whether the global turn is just one logical extension of the international
